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RECENT LEGISLATION
Civil Procedure-TITLE 8.01: VIRGINIA's NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT
I. SCOPE
On October 1, 1977, Title 8 of the Code of Virginia was repealed and
Title 8.01 became effective. The revisers of Title 8 have produced an
extensive, as well as comprehensive, change in the statutes which govern
civil procedure in Virginia. Most of the provisions have been rewritten,
deleted or moved to other titles. With several notable exceptions, civil
procedure in Virginia will remain basically unchanged. Much of the re-
visers' work leaves Title 8 substantively intact. The major changes will be
discussed in a chapter by chapter analysis of Title 8.01 in Section II of this
article.
The revisers of Title 8 have written a Statement which has been pub-
lished as "Revision of Title 8 of the Code of Virginia - Report of the
Virginia Code Commission to the Governor and General Assembly of Vir-
ginia."'
Although the General Assembly made several changes to Title 8.01 as
proposed by the Commission, the Code Commission's report serves as an
invaluable aid in understanding the scope of the changes and the intent
with which the revisions were made. In the report, each code provision is
followed by a note detailing the purpose of each change. These notes show
that the primary purpose of the recodification is to reorganize and modern-
ize the Virginia civil procedure statutes. Many sections have been rewrit-
ten or undergone minor language changes which do not materially alter
their meaning or effect. Some sections have been left unchanged; other
sections have been combined. Sections have been deleted as obsolete, un-
necessary, or no longer used in modern practice. Numerous others have
been deleted because the procedures they controlled were thought to be
better governed by the Rules of Court.
There has been an overall reorganization of Title 8; many provisions
have been moved to the chapters in which they more logically belong. For
the same reason, many provisions of Title 8 have been relocated to other
titles. For example, all provisions dealing with fees and costs have been
moved to Title 14.1 (Costs, Fees, Salaries and Allowances) and present
1. VA. CODE COMM'N REPORT, REvIsION OF TITLE 8 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA (House Docu-
ment No. 14, November 17, 1976) [hereinafter cited as H. Doc. 14].
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Chapter 38 dealing with trespasses and fences has been moved to Title 55
(Property and Conveyances). All criminal procedure provisions have like-
wise been purged from Title 8.01.2
The revisers attempted to clarify many provisions of Title 8 in order to
relieve the present uncertainty and confusion of some statutes and to
avoid potential areas of doubt. In many instances, present case law has
been codified in Title 8.01.
Confusing and obsolete procedural distinctions have also been elimi-
nated. Under Title 8.01 the differences in procedures between circuit
courts in term and in vacation have been abolished.3 In most cases, proce-
dural differences between district and circuit courts have been eliminated.
In many statutes, dollar limitations have been changed to reflect present
monetary values.
It should be stressed that Title 8.01 does not fundamentally alter Vir-
ginia Civil Procedure. It modernizes, consolidates, simplifies, clarifies and
condenses Title 8, but there are few major changes. The Virginia practi-
tioner will not have to relearn civil procedure in order to practice in Vir-
ginia courts. The following section of this article will highlight those
changes which appear most significant.
II. HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES IN THE LAW
A. CHAPTER 1 - General Provisions as to Civil Cases
An attempt has been made to collect all preliminary matters in an
introductory chapter to Title 8.01. Toward that end, a definitional section
has been provided.4 Included are sections authorizing the promulgation of
Rules of Court by the Supreme Court of Virginia,' and circuit and district
courts.6 Realizing that the passage of Title 8.01 and its application might
well work inequities and materially alter substantive rights, courts have
been given discretion in applying the new provisions.7 Thus in actions
arising prior to the effective date (October 1, 1977), the central question
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-260 (Repl. Vol. 1975) of the Criminal Procedure Title provides that
trial by jury in criminal cases shall be regulated by Title 8. For this reason, several references
to criminal cases are retained in Chapter 11 (Juries). H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 219.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-445 (Repl. Vol. 1977) abolishes the distinction between what a
court may do in term as opposed to vacation. References to term and vacation have been
deleted throughout Title 8.01.
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-2 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-3.A. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-4 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-1 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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when considering the propriety of the application of Title 8.01 is whether
such application will work a miscarriage of justice.8
In order to promote uniformity of definition throughout the code of civil
procedure, the revisers advocated the use of the general terms, "person
under a disability"' and "fiduciary,"'" to embrace certain classes of parties
that are enumerated in the statute. The lists do not purport to be exclu-
sive. The use of these generic terms was not intended in any way to alter
existing law in Virginia involving or concerning those persons who are
reclassified "persons under a disability" or "fiduciaries." The definitions
are intended only to simplify, to clarify and to provide consistency in
subsequent code provisions."
The revisers consolidated the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court into one section 2 and provided that such rules shall become effective
sixty days from adoption. 3 Provision was made for the legislature to mo-
dify or annul any rule so promulgated by subsequent legislation."
Older Virginia practice permitted district and circuit courts to promul-
gate local rules for the "orderly management of court dockets."' 5 Because
it was determined that this standard created more confusion than uniform-
ity of local rules, the standard was changed to the promotion of "proper
order and decorum, and the convenient and efficient use of court houses
and clerks' offices."' 16
B. CHAPTER 2 - Parties
All provisions relating to parties in a civil action have been collected and
located in this chapter. The revisers emphasized the policy of allowing the
8. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 54.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-2.6. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-2.3. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
11. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 56.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-3 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-3.B. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-3.D. (Repl. Vol. 1977). Since Title 8.01 deals only with civil
procedure, all references to criminal practice in Title 8 were deleted. H. Doc. 14, supra note
1, at 57. Thus, some holes are created unless appropriate additions are made in Title 19.2
(Code of Criminal Procedure). For example, § 8.01-3.D. provides the procedure whereby the
legislature may by subsequent legislation nmbdify or annul a Rule of Court. Since the revisers
have indicated that this provision applies only to civil rules of court, it is submitted that there
will be a real point of controversy when a criminal statute is in direct conflict with a criminal
rule (part 3:A, Rules of Court). A provision similar in substance to § 8.01-3.D. should be
included in the appropriate position in Title 19.2.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-1.3 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-4 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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addition and deletion of parties to an action without prejudice until the
proper parties are before the court. They abolished cumbersome and anti-
quated practices and urged that the statutes and corresponding Rules of
Court be correlated.
The revisers noted that the policy of section 8-96 relating to nonjoinder
and misjoinder of parties has been carried over to section 8.01-5, but some
of the intricacies of the older statute have been omitted as superfluous in
light of certain Rules of Court.' 7 The distinction between the court's ability
to add parties in an action at law and a suit in equity has been dropped,'8
giving the court broad discretion in adding parties sua sponte.
The spirit of section 8.01-2 urging definitional uniformity is evident in
section 8.01-9, which provides that a guardian ad litem is to be appointed
for all persons under a disability,'9 unless that person is represented as a
party defendant by an attorney licensed to practice in Virginia. In that
case, such an appointment is not necessary unless a statute specifically
requires that an answer be filed by a guardian ad litem or in the exercise
of its discretion, the court determines that the interests of justice require
the appointment of a guardian ad litem." If such a determination is made,
the court may appoint the attorney of record to serve in that capacity.2 '
The writ of scire facias was viewed as an obsolete, complicated and
cumbersome method of reviving'actions and judgments and its use was
therefore abolished."2 In its place was substituted a motion in the nature
of a writ of scire facias, a simpler and more direct form of pleading analo-
gous to the procedure used in the federal courts.? This use is evident in
the operation of section 8.01-16 which gives the court discretion in granting
a continuance to a new party in a case, whether he be joined or substituted,
after such party has requested the continuance by making an appropriate
motion. Formerly the party would have proceeded by writ of scire facias. 21
A plaintiff may now continue a suit to final judgment against a defen-
dant whose powers cease (e.g., an executor who has died) in equity or at
law. 25 Older Virginia practice did not permit such an action at law. If a
17. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 59, citing, Rules of Court 2:15, 3:9A and 3:14.
18. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 60.
19. VA CODE ANN. § 8.01-9.A. (Rep. Vol. 1977). See note 11 and accompanying text, supra.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-9.B. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
21. Id. In addition to codifying modern Virginia practice, this provision was intended to
require that if the attorney of record is appointed to serve as guardian ad litem, he should be
licensed to practice in Virginia. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 62.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-24 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(b).
24. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 64.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-17 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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party dies in an action in which there are several plaintiffs or defendants,
the court is given discretion to sever the action or suit so that the case may
continue against the remaining parties without delay, or to suspend the
case until a successor in interest is appointed in accordance with the Rules
of Court.2 1
C. CHAPTER 3 - Actions
All provisions that recognize a cause of action have been consolidated
into a single chapter. Contained therein are twenty specific articles and a
catchall (article twenty-one) in which provisions relating to actions but
having no other logical place in the chapter are located. Articles in which
no substantive changes were made will not be discussed.
1. Article I - Survival and Assignment of Causes of Action
Whereas older statutes provided that all causes of action survive death,
the wording was negative and the revisers were of the opinion that a posi-
tive statement would eliminate any possible confusion.Y In order to recon-
cile conflicting case law,2s it has been recommended that section 64.1-145
be rewritten to provide that damage to an estate of a decedent, either
direct or indirect, may be the basis of an action by or against the dece-
dent's personal representative. In codifying current case law, punitive
damages are not allowed after the death of a party liable for an injury2
and it has been recognized that the Virginia wrongful death statute is not
a "survival" statute, but one which creates a new right in the personal
representative of the decedent."
Formerly the test for assignability of causes of action was the survival
of such causes. With the passage of section 8.01-25, all causes of action
survive and in order to maintain the status quo as far as assignability is
concerned, section 8.01-26 allows assignment only of causes of action for
damage to real or personal property (whether direct or indirect) or causes
of action ex contractu.3 '
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-22 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
27. Thus VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-25 (Repl. Vol. 1977) states: "Every cause of action whether
legal or equitable, which is cognizable in the Commonwealth of Virginia, shall survive....
28. Compare Cover v. Critcher, 143 Va. 357, 130 S.E. 238 (1925) with Worrie v. Boze, 198
Va. 533, 95 S.E.2d 192 (1957) and Trust Co. of Norfolk v. Fletcher, 152 Va. 868, 148 S.E. 785
(1929).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-25 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
30. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 69 and cases cited therein. gee VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50
(Repl. Vol. 1977).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-26 (Repl. Vol. 1977). This codifies current case law except for
1977]
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2. Article 5 - Death by Wrongful Act
In awarding damages for wrongful death, the jury or court may not
include punitive damages.32 This alters the general rule that punitive dam-
ages may be awarded unless the person liable has died.3 3 Section 8.01-52
provides some factors the court or jury may consider in arriving at a figure
for damages, but these factors are suggested only as guidelines and are not
exclusive. If the award includes costs for care, treatment, hospitalization
or funeral expenses, the court or jury must so specifically state in order for
proper apportionment to creditors who provided such services.
3 4
There formerly existed an illogical conflict dealing with the class and
beneficiaries to receive any damage award. If the decedent was survived
by no children or grandchildren, but by a spouse and a parent, the distri-
bution would be made to the surviving spouse and parent.n Strictly con-
strued, this would have precluded such a distribuution had the decedent
been survived by both parents and a spouse, and in order to preclude this
result, appropriate statutory changes have been made. 6 In any event, if
either party so requests, the jury may be required to specify the distribu-
tion of the award and if they are unable to agree, the court shall apportion
the distribution.3 7
If the jury determines the award, the class of persons eligible to receive
the distribution is fixed at the time the verdict is entered and if the court
specifies the distribution, the class is established at the time the judgment
is rendered. This codifies present case law.39
A former statute provided that the recovery would be paid to the per-
sonal representative who would pay costs and reasonable attorney's fees
before distributing each share." The revisers recommended that in addi-
tion to costs and attorney's fees, the personal representative must distrib-
the distinction between direct and indirect damage to property. See Friedman v. People's
Service Drug Stores, 208 Va. 700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968); Birmingham v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 98 Va. 548, 37 S.E. 17 (1900).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52 (Repl. Vol. 1977). This codifies current case law. See Wilson
v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 154 S.E.2d 124 (1967).
33. Dalton v. Johnson, 204 Va. 102, 129 S.E.2d 647 (1963). See note 29 and accompanying
text, supra.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-638 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-53.A.(iii) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-54.B. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-53.B. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
39. See, e.g., Johns v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 199 Va. 63, 97 S.E.2d 723 (1957); Balti-
more & Ohio R.R. v. Wightman's Adm'r., 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 431 (1877).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-638 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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ute the amount specifically allocated to hospital, medical and funeral
expenses before distributing the remainder to those persons eligible to
receive the award under section 8.01-53. '
Previously, a statute provided that the right of action was not to deter-
mine nor an action brought to abate upon the death of the defendant or
the dissolution of a corporate defendant." Language has been added which
extends the thrust of this provision to other organizations such as associa-
tions and trusts."
3. Article 8 - Actions for the Sale, Lease, Exchange, Redemption and
Other Disposition of Lands of Persons Under a Disability
Without an exhaustive listing of the reasons that the court may order a
sale, lease, etc., of lands of one classified as "under a disability,"" the
legislature has provided that such disposition shall be made if it will
"promote the interest of an owner of land," after taking into consideration
the rights of any other party interested in the land. Simpler procedures
have been enacted with respect to new and renewal leases on behalf of
persons under a disability." The court has been given more discretion in
regard to the procedure to be followed in the alternate method for the sale
of real estate of one under a disability.
4. Article 12 - Detinue
Detinue in Virginia has long been given judicial approval as an accept-
able vehicle for debt collection,48 however older practice allowed the defen-
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-54.C. (Repl. Vol. 1977). The specification is required in order for
the statute to be in concert with section 8.01-52. See note 34 and accompanying text, supra.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-640 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-56 (Repl. Vol. 1977). '"The right of action under § 8.01-50 shall
not determine, nor the action, when brought, abate by the death, dissolution or other termi-
nation of a defendant. . . ." (Emphasis added). See H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 85.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-2.6. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-68 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The statute allows the court to exercise its
ancient equity jurisdiction. To that end VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-675, 8-677, 8-681, 8-682 and 8-
683 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (which provided specific instances in which disposition might have been
made if the proper showing was made to the court) have been deleted as unnecessary. See
H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 89.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-74 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The section is an expansion of VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-674 (Repl. Vol. 1957) which did not provide for new leases where no prior lease
existed.
47. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-78 to -80 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The use of commissioners in chan-
cery or special commissioners is no longer mandatory. They are to be appointed in the
discretion of the court.
48. See Lloyd v. Federal Motor Truck Co., 168 Va. 72, 190 S.E. 257 (1937).
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dant to elect to return the specific property which was the object of the
suit. In case of such an election, no deficiency judgment was allowed the
plaintiff. In a statute altering this common law concept, the plaintiff may
now recover a deficiency judgment when the defendant, upon exercising
his election, surrenders used or damaged property which is not sufficient
to satisfy the judgment.49 The procedures to be followed by the plaintiff
are those of the Uniform Commercial Code0 requiring compliance with
"reasonable commercial practice."
5. Article 13 - Unlawful Entry and Detainer
This article has undergone a general revision consistent with the policies
behind the revision of Title 8. The language has been clarified without
making substantive changes;-' provisions which formerly included statutes
of limitation52 and references to venue 3 have been retained in substance
but those references have been relocated in appropriate chapters.', Also,
language has been deleted from former statutes, giving further discretion
to the courts."
6. Article 18 - Recovery of Claims Against the Commonwealth of
Virginia
The former statute6 has been substantially modified. In addition to
transferring and changing the statute of limitations contained therein,17
language pertaining to "any other claim" has been deleted evidencing the
intent of the revisers to restrict the application of the new statute to pecu-
niary claims against the Commonwealth of Virginia. 8 Also, the former
requirement that claims instituted under this section be brought only in
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-121 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
50. VA. CODE ANN. 9H 8.9-501 to -507 (Interim Supp. 1977).
51. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8-789 (Cum. Supp. 1976), with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-124
(Repl. Vol. 1977).
52. VA. CODE ANN. 99 8-789, 8-793 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-794 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
54. See Chapter 4, VA. CODE ANN. 99 8.01-228 to -256 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (Limitations of
Actions); Chapter 5, VA. CODE ANN. 99 8.01-257 to -267 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (Venue).
55. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8-791.1 (Cure. Supp. 1976), with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-127
(Repl. Vol. 1977). The former statute required "sufficient corporate or cash security." This
language has been deleted allowing the court to determine the type and adequacy of the
security. Such a revision typifies the policy behind the comprehensive revision of Title 8. See
H. Doe. 14, supra note 1, at 114.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-752 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-192 (Repl. Vol.
1977).
57. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-255 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
58. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 130.
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the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond has been expanded and the
plaintiff is now allowed to "petition an appropriate circuit court for re-
dress.""
D. CHAPmER 4 - Limitations of Actions
A prime objective of the legislature in the revision of Title 8 was the
institution of order to the Virginia Code of Civil Procedure. Nowhere is
the former state of disorder more evident than in the provisions relating
to limitations of actions. Chapter 4 of Title 8.01 attempts to collect these
scattered sections and classify them into five comprehensive categories:
general provisions," actions involving real estate," personal actions, limi-
tations on enforcement of judgments and decrees, 3 and miscellaneous lim-
itations provisions. 4
At the outset, it has been emphasized that "the provision that limita-
tions prescribed in this chapter apply to suits in equity is not intended to
supersede the ancient and established rule of laches. . . ."I' Legal claims,
when adjudicated in equity, have traditionally provided a situation
whereby an analogy may be drawn to the applicable statute of limitations.
Instances which have the general effect of tolling or suspending the
running of a statute of limitation have been consolidated into a compre-
hensive provision.6 Contrary to former Virginia practice, disabilities which
arise after the accrual of a cause of action suspend the running of the
limitations period. For purposes of this statute, the disabilities which will
toll the running of the statute of limitations are limited to infancy and
insanity." A similar provision tolls the statute for an inmate, during the
period of his incarceration, for actions which he is entitled to bring against
his committee. There is no similar tolling provision for all other actions
which the convict may bring.69
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-192 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Presumably this change will reduce the
time and expense to a plaintiff for the bringing of an action against the Commonwealth.
60. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-228 to -235 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
61. VA. CODE ANN. 99 8.01-236 to -242 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
62. VA. CODE ANN. 99 8.01-243 to -250 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
63. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-251 to -252 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
64. VA. CODE ANN. 9 8.01-253 to -256 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
65. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 139.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.A. (Repl. Vol. 1977). "Fairness to the plaintiff requires that
supervening disability toll the statute of limitations as well as disability existing at the time
the cause of action accrues." H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 142.
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.A.(3) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
69. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 142.
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Changes have been made in limitations provisions dealing with the
death of a party. Former Virginia practice designated the date of death as
the determinative date for limitations purposes. Section 8.01-229 provides
that the critical time is the date of qualification of the decedent's personal
representative."0 If the decedent is a prospective plaintiff and no action has
been commenced by the date of death, the action must be filed by the
personal representative before the expiration of the applicable limitation
period or within one year after his qualification, whichever occurs later."
If the decedent is a prospective defendant and no action has been brought
by the date of death, the limitation period is extended until two years after
the qualification of the personal representative."
In cases in which a cause of action accrues against the estate of a dece-
dent after death, the claim may be filed within two years after accrual or
within two years after qualification of the personal representative, which-
ever occurs later. 3 This addresses the problem that would arise when a
cause of action arises shortly before the two year period after qualification
of a personal representative is to expire. If accrual of a personal cause of
action in favor of a decedent occurs after death, the action may be insti-
tuted by the personal representative either within the applicable limita-
tions period or within one year after his qualification, whichever is later. 4
Typifying a policy evident throughout the revision of Title 8, the statute
of limitations is tolled if a timely action is commenced and subsequently
stayed by injunction." The rationale is that the plaintiff should not be
precluded from recovery before the merits of his case have been adjudi-
70. See, e.g., VA. CODEANN. §§ 8.01-229.B.(1),8.01-229.B.(2), 8.01-229.B.(4), 8.01-229.B.(5)
(Repl. Vol. 1977). If the qualification of a personal representative occurs more than two years
after the decedent's death, for purposes of the running of the limitations period, he will be
deemed to have qualified on the last day of the two year period. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
229.B.(6) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.B.(1) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.B.(2) (Repl. Vol. 1977). This provision achieves the dual
objectives of preserving a cause of action against a decedent for a reasonable length of time
and providing a definite date after which no claims may be asserted against the estate,
therefore providing a procedure whereby probate may be efficiently administered. H. Doc.
14, supra note 1, at 143. If sections 8.01-229.B.(1) and 8.01-229.B.(2) both appear applicable,
the latter will control. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.B.(2) (RepI. Vol. 1977).
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.B.(4) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.B.(5) (Repl. Vol. 1977). This section was enacted to fill a
statutory void. Section 8-32 provided for the situation whereby the decedent died before
accrual of a cause of action and the qualification of the personal representative was delayed
for more than two years. No former statute dealt with the possibility of the accrual of a cause
of action after death and there is no delay in the qualification of the personal representative.
H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 144.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.C. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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cated, since the defendant has been given notice that an action has been
brought against him within the limitations period. 8 Similarly, if an action
is brought within the limitations period and abates or is dismissed without
determining the merits, the time that the action was pending is not com-
puted as part of the period within which another action may be brought."
Also, if a judgment for the plaintiff is arrested or reversed on grounds not
precluding a new action for the same cause, or if a former action was
properly commenced and the papers or records were subsequently lost, a
new action may be brought within one year after the arrest, reversal, loss
or destruction.78 Additionally, a plaintiff who reinstitutes his action within
six months after suffering a voluntary nonsuit will have the statute of
limitations tolled by the nonsuited action. 79
Finally, if the defendant prevents service of process in any manner after
an action has been instituted against him, the time that such prevention
continued is not included in the computation of the limitations period."
Formerly this provision was limited to defendants "who had before resided
in the Commonwealth. '8 1
The revisers recognized the confusion apparent in Virginia decisions
determining when a cause of action accrues and a statute of limitations
begins to run 2 and section 8.01-230 is intended to resolve any existing
conflicts. The section codifies the general rule that the cause accrues and
the statute begins to run when the wrongful act or breach of contract or
duty occurs, and not the date of discovery. Exceptions are made where
expressly provided by statutel or where relief sought is solely equitable.
76. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 145.
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.E.(1) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.E.(2) (Repl. Vol. 1977). The policy underlying all of these
statutes is that the "plaintiff who brings his action within due time should not be denied a
decision on the merits because of subsequent procedural developments or fortuities which
have no bearing upon the purpose of statutes of limitations." H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at
145.
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.E.(3) (Repl. Vol. 1977). Since a party pursuant to section
8.01-380.B. may have only one nonsuit as a matter of right, the defendant should not suffer
undue hardship under this provision.
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.D. (Repl. Vol. 1977). "Also, it should be noted that the
limitation period is not tolled if process can be served despite the defendant's absence - e.g.
service of process under the 'long arm' statute." H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 145.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-33 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
82. Compare Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966) and Brunswick Land
Corp. v. Perkinson, 153 Va. 603, 151 S.E. 138 (1930), with Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
406 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1969) and Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257
(1969).
83. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-233, -245.C., -249 and -250 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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A substantive change has been made in the method of pleading a statute
of limitations. The averment that an action is barred by a statute can only
be raised as an affirmative defense specifically set forth in a responsive
pleading. 4 This renders useless the distinction heretofore drawn between
"special" and "pure" statutes of limitations and overrules current Virginia
case law." All jurisdictional considerations have been removed from the
application of statutes of limitations and it is no longer proper to assert
statutes of limitations by demurrer. While this will place a burden on
defendants to provide more specificity in pleadings, the uniformity, sim-
plicity and certainty in pleadings that will result outweigh that burden. 8
Since disabilities may arise which would toll the statute of limitations
for an indefinite period under section 8.01-229(A) and since there is a need
for security in land titles, the legislature has provided that notwithstand-
ing the provisions of section 8.01-229(A), no disabilities or tacking of disa-
bilities shall operate to allow any person or his successors the right to enter
or bring an action to recover land more than twenty-five years after the
cause of action has accrued.87
Actions for personal injury, including an action for emotional injuries
must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action;"
however, if the injury results in death, the limitation for wrongful death
actions is applicable. 9
Numerous provisions relating to the limitations periods for actions on
various types of contracts have been consolidated into a comprehensive
section. It was recognized that section 8.2-725 controls the comprehensive
statute for applicable actions but the U.C.C. provision does not apply to
personal injury actions or actions for property damage which are not sub-
ject to a contract of sale. 1
Actions for fraud, mistake and rescission of a contract for undue influ-
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-235 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
85. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 149. See Branch v. Branch, 172 Va. 413, 2 S.E.2d 327
(1939).
86. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 149-50.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-237 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See note 68 and accompanying text, supra.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Where the conduct causing the emotional
injury is not willful, wanton or vindictive, but is "merely negligent and there is no physical
impact, recovery may be had for the emotional injury only if the resulting physical injury
has been the proximate result of such emotional injury." H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 153.
See Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974), for the elements that
must be proven to recover for emotional injury unaccompanied by physical injury.
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-244 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
91. Id.
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ence do not accrue until the fraud, mistake or undue influence is discov-
ered or until in the exercise of reasonable diligence, it should have been
discovered.2 Also proposed was a provision that would extend the above
standard to the accrual of actions in cases of professional malpractice, but
that provision was rejected by the legislature. 3 The limitation period on
actions for damages arising from defective or unsafe improvements to
realty that could not reasonably be discovered within five years has been
extended. Such actions may now be brought within six months of discovery
but in no event after ten years. 4
Formerly, statutes of limitations for claims against the Commonwealth
were in conflict.9 5 Presently any pecuniary claim authorized by sections
2.1-223.1 and 2.1-223.3 must be presented to the comptroller within five
years after the right to the claim arose, or it is barred. If properly presented
and disallowed, any resulting action against the Commonwealth must be
brought within three years of disallowance."
E. CHAPTER 5- Venue
The concept of venue as simply a fair and convenient place of trial is
not a new one in the law. At common law, venue related only to the place
of trial in geographical terms, but statutes and decisions in Virginia pro-
vided jurisdictional aspects to venue." Thus it became possible for impro-
per venue to result in dismissal or a void judgment." In an effort to distin-
guish the concepts, section 8.01-258 provides that "[n]o order, judgment,
or decree shall be voidable, avoided, or subject to collateral attack solely
on the ground that there was improper venue ... "
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249.1. (Repl. Vol. 1977). The passage of this section was foresha-
dowed by Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969). See also Stevens
v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
93. See H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 159. The well publicized crisis in the area of profes-
sional malpractice insurance may well have provided a strong reason for the defeat of the
proposed provision. Its passage could only have increased the number of actions filed and
correspondingly prompted a rise in liability insurance rates.
94. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-250.1., -250.2. (Repl. Vol. 1977). These provisions, modeled after
ALA. CODE title 7, § 23(1) (1969) and Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.131 (1954) (Page), have
the effect of overruling Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Laburnum Con-
struction Corp., 195 Va. 827, 80 S.E.2d 574 (1954).
95. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8-752 (Cum. Supp. 1976), with VA. CODE ANN. § 8-757 (Repl.
Vol. 1977).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-255 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
97. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-179 (Repl. Vol. 1977) pertaining to the motion for
judgment to establish real estate boundary lines. This section was derived from VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-836 (Repl. Vol. 1957) but the reference to jurisdiction in the old statute was deleted
since it apparently meant venue. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 126.
98. See Davis v. Mart, 200 Va. 479, 106 S.E.2d 722 (1959).
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The revisers have noted that the concept of proper venue historically
required that the action be tried in the place where the wrongful act alleg-
edly occurred so the jury could decide the case on their personal knowledge
of the facts. 9 Since juries are no longer permitted to decide cases on this
basis and service of process is now conceived to operate to give the defen-
dant notice of an action and an opportunity to defend himself, jurisdic-
tional aspects of venue are no longer necessary. As a result, those actions
in which "mandatory venue" was formerly applicable have been generally
included in section 8.01-261 which is designated "Category A" or
"preferred venue."'' 0 Under sections 8.01-258 and 8.01-264, dismissal is not
an available remedy for venue improperly laid, and upon timely objection
the remedy is the transfer of the action to a "preferred" forum. If the
objection is not properly and timely made, it will be deemed waived.''
For actions to which "preferred venue" does not apply, section 8.01-262
provides a "Category B" or "permissible venue." This statute will apply
to the vast majority of civil actions in Virginia. Subsections one through
nine listed in the statute are cumulative, and the plaintiff may choose any
to which his cause of action is applicable. Section 8.01-262.10 is a provision
of last resort. If no other forum, "preferred" or "permissible" is available,
the action is allowed in the city or county of plaintiff's residence. This
provision insures that the revised venue chapter will not operate in a juris-
dictional manner and no action will be dismissed for lack of a proper
forum.
In addition to including the city or county of the defendant's residence,
it is now possible to bring an action in the city or county of his principal
place of employment,0 2 or where he regularly does business.0 3 In an at-
tempt to protect the Virginia retailer, section 8.01-262.8 provides that in
99. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 167.
100. These actions include: (1) actions to appeal, review or enforce State administrative
regulations, (2) actions against officers of the Commonwealth in their official capacities, (3)
actions concerning land, (4) actions for writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari except
those issued by the Virginia Supreme Court, (5) actions on bonds for public contracts, (6)
actions to impeach or establish a will, (7) actions to assign or recover dower or curtesy and
actions to waive jointure and demand dower, (8) actions on contracts between a transporta-
tion district and a component government, (9) attachments, (10) actions to partition personal
property and (11) actions to collect state, county or municipal taxes.
101. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-264 (Repl. Vol. 1977) for the proper time and method of
registering the objection. If the objection is deemed waived, the venue objection is not subject
to collateral attack. Thus a situation similar to that in Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309, 130 S.E.2d
582 (1963), should no longer arise.
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262.1. (Repl. Vol. 1977). This expands VA. CODE ANN. § 8-38(1)
(Repl. Vol. 1957).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262.3. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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actions involving the delivery of goods, "permissible venue" will lie where
the goods were received.' °
Certain proceedings were deemed too specialized to be covered by the
general venue chapter,0 5 and the special statutes dealing with each were
preserved. Therefore Chapter 5 of Title 8.01 is not intended to apply to
these enumerated actions. 0
6
If multiple parties are involved, preferred venue will lie whenever any
party is entitled to it and if not, venue will not be subject to objection if it
is proper as to at least one resident defendant.' In all other cases, venue
need only be proper as to any party. 0 8
A forum non conveniens provision has been retained and is a consolida-
tion of earlier provisions.' If venue is "preferred" and has been properly
laid, the case may be transferred only upon agreement of all parties. If
venue is "permissible" and is improperly laid, the court may, on motion
of the plaintiff and upon a showing of good cause, retain the case for trial.
If proper, but inconvenient venue has been laid, the same statute will allow
the court to move the action to a more convenient forum. Good cause is
suggested to include the agreement of the parties, or the avoidance of
inconvenience to witnesses or parties."'
Mandatory sanctions are imposed when an action is transferred because
venue was improperly laid or upon one who makes a frivolous motion to
transfer."' Thus, once the court exercises its discretion to transfer, it must
104. It was felt that the place of delivery would be the most convenient for witnesses and
the production of tangible evidence of defective delivery, particularly against nonresident
middlemen. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 177.
105. These include: (1) writs of quo warranto, (2) suspension or disbarment of attorneys,
(3) habeas corpus, (4) certain tax proceedings, (5) Juvenile and Domestic Relations District
Court proceedings concerning children, (6) domestic relations proceedings, (7) adoptions and
(8) injunctions. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-259 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-259 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-263.1. (Repl. Vol. 1977). The prevailing policy is that "Virginia
should be more concerned with the convenience of residents than nonresidents, and ... a
plaintiff should not be able to choose a forum less convenient to a resident defendant by
joining a nonresident." H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 178.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-263.2. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-265 (Repl. Vol. 1977). This provision readopts section 8-158
which was repealed in 1966.
110. Id. See H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 180.
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-266 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The court "shall award an amount neces-
sary to compensate a party for such inconvenience, expense, and delay as he may have been
caused by the commencement of the suit in a forum to which an objection pursuant to § 8.01-
264 is sustained or by the bringing of a frivolous motion to transfer." Id.
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impose costs."' Just and reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded in the
discretion of the court.
F. CHAPTER 7 - Civil Actions
In the formulation of this chapter, much consideration was given to a
procedural merger of law and equity by adopting a single form of action.
The revisers recognized that forty-five states have adopted the single
form"3 but concluded that the present system was firmly established and
they were not satisfied that the single form would "(1) better protect the
rights of individuals in civil cases to trial by jury; (2) that the principles
of stare decisis and equitable relief would be better preserved; or (3) that
judicial activism would be discouraged."114 Accordingly, a proposal similar
in substance to Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 was not recommended.
Traditional Virginia practice had prohibited the joinder of tort and con-
tract claims,"5 and recognizing that this prohibition exalted form over
substance and produced multiple litigation with regard to similar facts,
such joinder is now permitted provided all claims joined arise out of the
same transaction or occurrance."6 It was recognized that formerly, such
joinder was allowed in counterclaims against a plaintiff and while the
revision does not go as far as FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a), it eases what was
formerly a harsh burden on plaintiffs.
Similarly, the restriction that alternative pleading is allowed only in
actions arising out of motor vehicle accidents' 7 has been abolished and it
is now possible to plead alternative facts and theories of recovery provided
the claim, defense, or demand for relief arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence."' It was recognized that such alternative pleadings may
make it appropriate to sever separate issues or claims and provision was
made giving the court discretion to do so." 9 The legislature was of the
opinion that a Rule of Court may be necessary to specify the form of the
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Also within the sound discretion of the
court is the amount of the costs awarded under section 8.01-266. This somewhat tempers the
harsh application of that provision.
113. H. Doc. 14, Appendix I, supra note 1, at 30.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Standard Products v. Woolridge, 214 Va. 476, 201 S.E.2d 801 (1974); Kavan-
augh v. Donovan, 186 Va. 85, 41 S.E.2d 489 (1947).
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-272 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-96.1. (Cum. Supp. 1976).
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-281.A. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-282.B. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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alternative pleadings and also that the section was intended to have no
application in class action suits.'2"
The form of a demurrer has been altered. Formerly the specific grounds
of a demurrer were not required 'o be stated unless the court so required
or upon motion of a party to the action. Requiring a demurrant to state in
writing the specific grounds of demurrer and allowing consideration only
of those grounds stated in the demurrer' 2' not only codifies current case
law,'22 but it more clearly informs the parties to the action of the nature of
the defense.
The use of a motion to strike a defensive pleading is now the proper
procedure in equity and at law. ' Older procedure providing that the de-
murrer was the proper method of testing the sufficiency of a defensive
pleading has been abolished, and currently either at law or in equity, the
sufficiency of aggreesive pleadings is challenged by demurrer, that of de-
fensive pleadings is challenged by motion to strike.'2
Pleas in abatement and demurrers to the evidence have been abol-
ished. 121 Defenses formerly asserted by a plea in abatement are now made
by a written motion in the nature of a plea in abatement, stating the
requested relief and the grounds upon which such relief is to be based. 2
It has long been the Virginia practice that any matter for which the hazard-
ous demurrer to the evidence '2 would lie may also be reached by a motion
to strike the evidence,"' and since the latter has become the more popular
form, the demurrer to the evidence has been abolished as obsolete. 21
Formerly, a plea in abatement would lie for defective, but amendable
processes while a motion to quash was proper for invalid, thus nonamenda-
ble processes."' Recognizing that only one form of motion is necessary to
draw the attention of the court to questions concerning process, and since
120. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 191.
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-273 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The plea in abatement was most fre-
quently used to challenge venue, and since more liberal transfer provisions have been
adopted to correspond with the more modem view of venue, the written motion, a more
modem form of pleading, has been adopted.
122. See, e.g., Klein v. National Toddle House Corp., 210 Va. 641, 172 S.E.2d 782 (1970);
Virginia & S.W. Ry. v. Hollingsworth, 107 Va. 359, 58 S.E. 572 (1907).
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-274 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
124. VA. CODE ANN. 44 8.01-273, -274 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-276 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
126. Id.
127. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-140 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
128. Green v. Smith, 153 Va. 675, 151 S.E. 282 (1930).
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-276 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-118 (Repl. Vol. 1957). See H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 189.
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a plea in abatement has been abolished, challenges to process are now
properly made by a motion to quash, after which the court, in a proper
situation, may either dismiss the action or permit amendment of the pro-
cess or its return. 13'
G. CHAPTER 8 - Process
The rules governing service of process in Virginia have not been changed
significantly. The changes which have been made should provide for a
more uniform, convenient, logical and fair system for serving process. The
most important change allows statewide service of process without the
previous restrictions based on the venue of the court where the cause of
action arose or was brought.'
31
There are numerous changes in how, where and by whom process shall
be served and how such process is to be proved. These alterations are of
concern primarily to those individuals who serve process, yet every practi-
tioner should be aware of the new provisions in order to insure that his
client is provided with the most effective use of the system.
Sheriffs are now able to serve process in any contiguous city or county
as well as in their own bailiwick.'3 An uninterested person over 18 years
of age may serve process without the necessity of any special procedures.
However, sheriffs must still serve original process in divorce and annul-
ment suits.' 34 The return of service by any qualified person constitutes
evidence of service, and a sheriff's return is prima facie evidence. Virginia's
judicially created verity rule has been abolished, and there no longer exists
such a thing as conclusive proof of service. 35
Several changes are directed to the notice element of service of process.
Except in divorce and annulment suits, process is served when it is re-
ceived, even if it has been neither served nor accepted. 3' When personal
service on a person or family member is unavailable, process must be
mailed to the person's last known address as well as posted at his abode.'3
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-277 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
132. Statewide service of process is authorized by VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-292 (Repl. Vol.
1977).
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-295 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-293 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-326 (Repl. Vol. 1977) abolishes the common law verity rule,
which stated that an officer's return of service, although false, was conclusive. See H. Doc.
14, supra note 1, at 213.
136. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-288 (Repl. Vol. 1977) amends VA. CODE ANN. § 8-53 (Repl. Vol.
1957) which provided for such a valid service only on individuals. Now notice of process
neither served nor accepted is valid on corporations. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 195.
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-296 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides an additional means by which a
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Procedures for service of process by publication have been revised in order
to provide both court clerks and parties a definite time frame for appear-
ance.1' When an attorney of record who enters a general appearance is
served with process, he must object to such process within five days, or the
service is valid. 3 ' Several alterations also have been made to simplify
procedures for the service of process on corporations, 4 ' and a revised proce-
dure for service of process on convicts has been adopted. 4 '
The privilege of certain parties from civil arrest has been restated in
order to eliminate confusion. With the exception of those persons ex-
empted in the provision, the privilege from service of process for other
persons has been left to the common law.'
H. CHAPTER 11 - Juries
Chapter 11 has undergone few substantive changes. The provisions relat-
ing to when a jury may be had in a civil action have been completely
rewritten in Title 8.01. The new statute immensely simplifies and clarifies
Title 8's provisions"4 while making only one substantive change in the
law.' Now the recovery sought must exceed $100 in order for there to be
person may receive notice of a pending civil action.
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-317 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides that the order of publication and
the publication itself contain a specific date on or before which the party served -is required
to appear and defend his interests. This date is to be no sooner than fifty days from the date
on which the order of publication is entered.
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-314 (Repl. Vol. 1977) reverses the procedure by which an attor-
ney of record who makes a general appearance can object to service of process. Under VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-69 (Repl. Vol. 1957) an attorney must have been provided with five days notice
before the entry of an order directing service on the attorney.
140. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-299 to -306 (Repl. Vol. 1977) deal with service of process on
foreign and domestic corporations; municipal, county and quasi-governmental bodies; part-
nerships; and unincorporated organizations.
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-297 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides for direct service of process on
the convict as well as on a guardian ad litem who must be appointed unless the convict is
already represented by counsel.
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-327.2 (Repl. Vol. 1977) lists such privileged persons. The revisers
discussed the reasons why such a limited statute of immunity from process was thought
desirable in H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 214-15.
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-336 (Repl. Vol. 1977) is a combination of VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-211 to -214 (Repl. Vol. 1957), 8-208.21 (Cum. Supp. 1976) and FED. R. CIv. P. 38(a).
144. The revision was made for the purpose of simplification and clarification. H. Doc. 14,
supra note 1, at 221. Trial by jury is a matter of right only in those causes where the issue
was triable by jury at common law in 1776 when Virginia adopted its first constitution. The
General Assembly, in creating new actions or remedies, may decide whether such causes shall
be tried by jury. When the legislature fails to indicate how a new action is to be tried, the
judiciary must decide to which common law action the new cause is most closely related.
Whether or not the new cause of action is entitled to jury determination is controlled by how
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a right to a trial by jury.'45
There are relatively minor changes in the procedures for objections to
jury list irregularities. Under Title 8.01 such objections may be made with
leave of the court even after the jury has been sworn.1" It is no longer
automatically reversible error if a juror should serve twice in a one year
period.'47 There are revised procedures concerning the number of jurors
necessary in civil cases and the way in which jury strikes are to be made
in actions with multiple parties.'
I. CHAPTER 12 - Interpleader; Claims Of Third Parties Levied On
Virginia interpleader practice has been completely revised by Title 8.01
with the view toward creating a simple, modern interpleader practice.
Under the new statute, Virginia's equitable interpleader is abolished"9 and
the present statutory interpleader is greatly expanded.' 0 The technical
equitable interpleader is replaced by a statute which retains only the re-
quirement that there be an identity of claims.'51 The statute is a combina-
the related common law action could be tried. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 220-21.
145. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-336.B. (Repl. Vol. 1977). Under VA. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (Repl.
Vol. 1957) trial by jury was available where the action was triable and the recovery sought
exceeded twenty dollars.
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-352 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
147. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-352.B. (1977). See H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 228.
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-359 (Repl. Vol. 1977) calls for a five member jury when the
amount involved is less than five thousand dollars instead of the one thousand dollars as
found in VA. CODE ANN. § 8-208.28 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Where there are more than two parties
in an action, all the plaintiffs share three strikes and the defendants and third party defen-
dants share three strikes from the panel.
149. The Supreme Court of Virginia had ruled in Runkle v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E.
695 (1911) that the old statutory interpleader provisions, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-226 to -227
(Repl. Vol. 1957) were supplemental to equitable interpleader. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-364
(Repl. Vol. 1977) is intended to abolish equitable interpleader. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at
236. It is impossible to conceive of a party bringing a motion for equitable interpleader when
the much more liberal provisions of VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01- 364 (Repl. Vol. 1977) are available.
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-226 (Repl. Vol. 1957) provided a statutory interpleader available
only to defendants. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-227 (Repl. Vol. 1957) provided a statutory interpleader
to test the ownership of distrained or levied upon property. Interpleader provided by VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.7-603 (Repl. Vol. 1965) (Uniform Commercial Code interpleader) is unaffected by
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-364 (Repl. Vol. 1977). H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 235.
151. Although VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-364 (Repl. Vol. 1977) is patterned on the federal
interpleader statute and rule, the requirement that there be an identity of claims has been
retained from the doctrine of equitable interpleader. The claims need not have a common
origin and can be founded in different theories of recovery, but the claims must relate to or
affect the same property or fund. The question of whether or not the equitable interpleader
requirement still exists that the interpleading party have incurred no independent liability
to any of the claimants has been left to the discretion of the courts. When the court finds
[Vol. 12:245
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tion of the federal interpleader rules of FED. R. Civ. P. 22 and 28 U.S.C. §
1335.15i A plaintiff or defendant who is or may be exposed to multiple
liability from or to different parties claiming the same fund property may
now, with the leave of court, bring all the claimants into a single action.
The court is granted the power to control the controversy by enjoining
claimants from bringing claims on the property or fund in other courts of
Virginia. The court is also empowered to discharge parties from liability,
make its injunctions permanent and issue orders to enforce its judgment.
The statute authorizes the interpleading party, either voluntarily or by
court order, to pay or tender into court the property claimed and thereupon
be discharged from liability.u13
J. CHA-mr 13 - Certain Incidents Of Trial
Several major changes have been made to nonsuit procedures. The new
section broadens the application of the nonsuit procedure 5 and, in con-
junction with the new statute of limitation provision in Chapter 4 of Title
8.01, makes nonsuiting a cause of action more attractive. 5 Only one non-
suit, however, is allowed as a matter of right. Adverse parties who have
filed cross-claims or third-party claims now receive the same protection
from an unconsented nonsuit as do parties with counterclaims."6
There are two other minor changes in Chapter 13. First, juries are ex-
pressly forbidden to take pleadings into the jury room but are allowed, with
the court's permission, to remove exhibits."7 Second, the provision allow-
that such independent liability does exist, the court may: dismiss the claim; order severance
or separate trials; or require the independent claim to be tried in the interpleader action. H.
Doc. 14, supra'note 1, at 235-36.
152. 'The substantive difference between federal statutory interpleader (28 U.S.C. § 1335
(1970)) and rule interpleader (FED. R. Civ. P. 22) and Virginia interpleader under VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-364 (Repl. Vol. 1977) is the retention of the identity of claims requirement in the
Virginia statute.
153. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-364 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Such a deposit is necessary in order to
terminate an existing obligation to pay interest. See H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 237.
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380 (RepI. Vol. 1977) expands the procedure, by making it
applicable to any cause of action or claim or to any party to the proceeding. H. Doc. 14, supra
note 1, at 243-44.
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.E.3. (Repl. Vol. 1977) tolls the statute of limitation on a
nonsuited cause of action if the action is recommenced within six months of the dismissal by
nonsuit.
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380 (Repl. Vol. 1977) makes the consent of parties who have
filed counterclaims, cross-claims or third party claims necessary before a cause of action may
be nonsuited unless those claims can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 244.
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-221 (Repl. Vol. 1957) permitted juries to take papers in evidence
into the jury room. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-381 (Repl. Vol. 1977) states that pleadings may not
be taken into the jury room but exhibits may taken in, with leave of the court.
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ing the verdict to fix the period from which interest will begin on a judg-
ment has been expanded to apply to all actions. Such a determination may
be rendered by the court as well as a jury, and the interest so awarded will
be considered as a part of the judgment.' 8
K. CHAPTER 14 - Evidence
The most obvious change in Chapter 14 is the removal of all provisions
relating to discovery.'59 The discovery rules are now to be found exclusively
in Part 4 of the Rules of Court.
There has been an extensive revision of the provisions governing judicial
notice and use of public and business records as evidence.' 0 The revised
sections facilitate the use of judicial notice and official and business re-
cords as evidence. The new provisions require that judicial notice be taken
of all law'"' including that of Virginia,' 2 other states, the United States and
other countries. Such notice is also required of all law of political subdivi-
sions and agencies of the above states and countries.' 3 Judicial notice is
required of all official publications of states, countries and their political
subdivisions.' 4 Properly authenticated judicial and official records of other
states and countries are to be received as prima facie evidence, and Vir-
ginia courts are required to give full faith and credit to such records.'65
Properly authenticated copies of official documents and business records
are to be given the same status as would be accorded the original.'66 There
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-382 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 245.
159. The discovery provisions deleted were VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-111.1, -301 to -327.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1976). See generally W.H. BRYSON, DiscovERY IN VIRGINIA (forthcoming).
160. The twenty statutes in Title 8 relating to such matters (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-263 to
-279.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976)) have been reduced to five statutes (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-386 to
-391 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
161. The term law as used in VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-386 (Repl. Vol. 1977) encompasses
statutes, ordinances, resolutions, judicial decisions and administrative rulings and regula-
tions. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 249.
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-386 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Under VA. CODE ANN. § § 8-263, -273 (Repl.
Vol. 1957) judicial notice was required of laws of other states and countries but the laws of
Virginia had to be entered into evidence and proved. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 248.
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-386.B. (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides the procedure by which the
court is to become aware of such law.
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-388 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-389 (Repl. Vol. 1977) gives a broad definition to the term record
and specifically includes records of deeds conveying any interest in real property. These
records must be authenticated by the clerk of the court and certified by the judge of the
jurisdiction where the records are maintained. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-390 (Repl. Vol. 1977)
gives properly authenticated non-judicial records status as prima facie evidence.
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-391 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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are also several minor changes in the procedure for establishing lost re-
cords. ' 7
There are three major changes in the provisions dealing with witnesses.
The introduction of evidentiary material 8 ' from a party to an action who
is incapable of testifying is no longer contingent on the adverse party
testifying."9 In any action where one spouse is permitted to sue the other,70
the statutory husband-wife communication privilege is abrogated.', The
power to summon witnesses has been extended to include persons acting
in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.' The power to punish as contempt
any disobedience of a valid summons is expressly authorized. A prior court
order is required to summon certain officials and judges. 7 3
Several provisions of Chapter 14 that were applicable only to circuit
courts or district courts have been made applicable to all courts.'" Nolo
contendere pleas and forfeitures as well as guilty pleas in criminal prosecu-
tions may now be admitted into evidence in a civil action based on the
same occurrence.
7 5
L. CHAPTER 15 - Payment And Set-Off
Chapter 15 of Title 8.01 bears little resemblance to its counterpart in
167. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-392 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides for the possibility that court
records may be retained on microfilm in the future, and provides for establishing such records
should they become lost or unreadable. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 250. VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-394 (Repl. Vol. 1977) abolishes the requirement that a commissioner be appointed to
establish lost records. Re-established lost records which are not questioned for twenty years
are binding under VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-395 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Repl. Vol. 1977) includes entries, memoranda and declara-
tions as the evidentiary material which may be introduced.
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Repl. Vol. 1977) clarifies VA. CODE ANN. § 8-286 (Repl. Vol.
1957) to indicate that it is applicable to a person under a disability. H. Doc. 14, supra note
1, at 252.
170. The revisers list three such actions: (1) in contract; (2) in tort for damage to the
spouse's property; and (3) in a personal injury suit arising out of an automobile accident. H.
Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 253.
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-398 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
172, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407 (Repl. Vol. 1977) is intended to delete the summons power
of umpires, justices, coroners and surveyors. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 257.
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.B. (Repl. Vol. 1977).
174. These provisions are VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-399 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (communications
between physicians and patients); 8.01-408 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (recognizance taken upon con-
tinuance of case); 8.01-409 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (when court may have process for witness exe-
cuted by its own officer in another county or city); and 8.01-416 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (affidavit
re: damages to motor vehicles).
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-418 (RepI. Vol. 1977).
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Title 8. Most of the provisions have been moved to other titles, 76 incorpo-
rated in provisions in other chapters,'77 deleted as obsolete, or are now
better governed by the Rules of Court.78 What remains of the chapter has
not been changed in substance.
M. CHAPTER 16 - Compromises
There has been an extensive revision of the procedures governing court
approval of compromises in suits where one of the parties is under a disa-
bility. 179 The phrase "person under a disability" has been adopted through-
out Title 8.01 in lieu of such terms as "incompetent", "incapacitated",
"insane" and "infant". The phrase includes all persons who, because of
some impairment, are unable to protect their legal rights. The right of an
infant to attack an order of compromise during the six month period after
attaining his majority has been eliminated.
N. CHAPTER 17 - Judgments And Decrees Generally
The provision that governs the setting aside of judgments has been re-
written in order to clarify the former statute,'' which has created consider-
able confusion. The new provision closely parallels FED. R. Cr. P. 55 and
176. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-239.1 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (counter-claims in proceedings before
trial justices) and 8-239.2 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (cross-claims in proceedings before trial justices)
have been moved to Title 16.1 (Courts Not of Record). H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 264.
177. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-244 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (when action deemed brought on counter-
claim or cross-claim; statute of limitations; defendant's counsel required for dismissal) has
been incorporated in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-233 and -380 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
178. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-239 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (right of set-off recognized; counterclaims
and cross-claims in courts of record); 8-240 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (when in action on contract
surety may counterclaim on claim of principal against plaintiff); 8-240.1 (Repl. Vol. 1957)
(when plaintiff allowed counter set-off; trial of issue); 8-245 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (procedure on
defendant's claim; excess); and 8-247 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (effect of chapter on voluntary bonds)
have all been deleted.
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-424 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
180. The revisers believed that infants should be provided no greater protection from
compromises entered into while they were minors than other persons whose disability has
been removed. Additionally, the proposal section provided for the appointment of a guardian
ad litem to represent the interests of all persons under a disability where the court entered
an order of compromise. The provision was thought to provide added protection to infants.
H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 267-68. The guardian ad litem requirement was deleted from
the Senate Bill and did not become a part of VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-424 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
181. In Federal Realty v. Litterio & Co., 213 Va. 3, 5, 189 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1972), the
Virginia Supreme Court stated that "the full intent and meaning of § 8-348 is not clear." The
revisers also pointed to the court's decision and the dissent in Highway Comm'r v. Easley,
215 Va. 197, 207 S.E.2d 870 (1974), as further indication of confusion. H. Doc. 14, supra note
1, at 270.
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60.112 The procedure by which judgments against joint tortfeasors are dis-
charged has been revised to provide a plaintiff with a better opportunity
to collect the full judgment.11 A lien for maintenance and support of a
spouse or infant child can now arise only after the order adjudicating the
obligor delinquent and creating the lien has been docketed, just as other
money judgments are docketed.'84
There are also two changes in the time limits provided in Chapter 17. A
confessed judgment debtor has twenty-one days in which to move that the
judgment be set aside or reduced.' 5 A judgment creditor has only thirty
days in which to note the payment or satisfaction of a judgment on the
judgment docket. '
0. CHAPTER 18 - Executions And Other Means Of Recovery
The only major change in Chapter 18 concerns liens on tangible personal
property. A lien will not become valid until the writ of fi. fa. has actually
been delivered by the levying officer. Under the common law, the writ was
binding from the time of its delivery to the officer. The change is intended
to protect the bona fide purchaser who buys tangible personal property
upon which a lien is in the process of being executed. ' There are numerous
minor changes in the chapter which should be consulted by individuals
who are concerned with executions.'8
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-443 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides that there must be satisfaction
and acceptance by the plaintiff before a discharge is allowed in an action involving joint
tortfeasors.
184. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-460 (Repl. Vol. 1977) makes the procedure for creating liens
arising out of support and maintenance decrees more like the procedures creating other liens.
H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 283.
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-433 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Under VA. CODE ANN. § 8-357 (Repl. Vol.
1957) the motion had to be made within ten days.
186. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-454 (Repl. Vol. 1977) reduces the ninety day period of VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-382 (Repl. Vol. 1957) to thirty days. The fine for failure to note such payment or
satisfaction has been increased from a maximum of twenty dollars to a maximum of fifty
dollars.
187. The change in VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-478 (Repl. Vol. 1977) protects a bona fide pur-
chaser from a judgment creditor in the process of executing a lien on the purchased goods.
The statute removes the protection which the judgment creditor formerly enjoyed against a
debtor who liquidated his assets in anticipation of the execution of liens. VA. CODE ANN. §§
8.01-481, -483 and -487 (Repl. Vol. 1977) have minor changes to conform with the revision of
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-478 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
188. The changes are in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-471 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (when writs of
possession in cities, etc., returnable); 8.01-498 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (selling officers and employ-
ees not to bid or purchase); 8.01-499 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (officers receiving money to make
return thereof and pay net proceeds); 8.01-504 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (penalty for service of such
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P. CHAPTER 20 - Attachments And Bail In Civil Cases
Only minor changes have been made in Chapter 20. The separate stat-
utes in Chapter 24 of Title 8 dealing with attachments for rent have been
deleted, and such attachments are now treated as other debts.' 9 Attach-
ments may be issued or executed on Sundays and holidays. 9 The proce-
dure for handling property given as an appeal bond has been revised.'9' The
distinction between liens on real and personal property has been elimi-
nated.'9 2 The time period within which a rehearing may be had on a judg-
ment rendered by publications has been reduced from five years to two
years. 9 3
Q. CHAPTER 21 - Arbitration And Award
The only substantive change in this chapter is the requirement that
arbitration agreements be in writing.'94
R. CHAPTER 22 - Receivers, General And Special
The coverage of the section providing the persons and entities for which
a receiver may be appointed has been expanded.'95 The duties of the per-
manent receiver have also been more clearly stated in order to provide
better protection to creditors.'99 The procedures for making claims upon
funds paid into the state treasury under a court order have been modified.
There is no longer any limit to the amount that may be paid out after a
notice when no judgment exists); 8.01-506 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (proceedings by interrogatories
to ascertain the estate of debtor; summons; proviso; objections by judgment debtor); 8.01-
511 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (institution of garnishment proceedings); 8.01-514 (Repl. Vol. 1977)
(when garnishment summons returnable); 8.01-521 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (judgments as to costs);
8.01-523 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (service upon federal government); and 8.01-527 (Repl. Vol. 1977)
(if bond forfeited, when returned; its effect; clerk to endorse time of return).
189. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-533 (Repl. Vol. 1977) is now applicable to debts arising from
rent. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-566 to -568 (Repl. Vol. 1957) have been deleted. See H. Doc. 14,
supra note 1, at 309.
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-542 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
191. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-555 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-557 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
193. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-575 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
194. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-577 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-595 (Repl. Vol. 1977) expands the provision for the appointment
of receivers to include "any other legal or commercial entity" in addition to the "person, firm,
corporation" definition found in VA. CODE ANN. § 8-739 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
196. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-595 (Repl. Vol. 1977) requires the permanent receiver to prepare
and distribute a creditor list if this procedure has not been completed by the temporary or
prior receiver.
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successful claim. 197 Appeals from the comptroller's decisions may now be
made to any circuit court.'98
S. CHAPTER 23 - Commissioners In Chancery
The constitutionally suspect clause that publication is equivalent to
personal service has been eliminated from the court-ordered accounting
provision. The statute has been revised to permit more definite notice of
the accounting to those concerned. 90
T. CHAPrER 24 - Injunctions
Two major changes have been made in injunction procedures: (1) Juve-
nile and Domestic Relations District Courts are now subject to injunc-
tions, "' and (2) a fifteen day time limit has been added to the statute
allowing a direct appeal to a single Supreme Court Justice from a circuit
court order granting, refusing, dissolving or refusing to enlarge an injunc-
tion. o'
U. CHAPTER 25 - Extraordinary Writs
The little-used common law writs of quo warranto and information in
the nature of a writ of quo warranto have been abolished and replaced by
a statutory writ.2 The procedures for the use of the writ have been com-
pletely rewritten. The summons in a writ of quo warranto requires the
defendant to appear at a date set forth in the writ, rather than at the next
term of court." 3 A copy of the petition must be attached to the writ.0 4 A
special venue statute has been retained for writs of quo warranto.2 0 5 A jury
is no longer required in proceedings by writ of quo warranto and a jury
must be requested.2"0 Monetary limits on the recovery of attorneys' fees
have been replaced by a reasonableness standard.2 "
197. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-605 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
198. Id. Under VA. CODE ANN. § 8-749 (Repl. Vol. 1957) such appeals were required to be
made to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.
199. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-611 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 342.
200. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-621 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
201. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-626 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
202. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-635 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-637 (Repl. Vol. 1977). If service is made by publication, VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-641 (Repl. Vol. 1977) gives the defendant only thirty days to move for a
rehearing on a default judgment.
204. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-639 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
205. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-638 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
206. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-643 (RepI. Vol. 1977).
207. Id.
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V. CHAPTER 26 - Appeals
There have been few major changes in the appeals procedures. The
chapter has, however, been extensively rewritten. A new provision has been
added defining terms.2 18 "Appeal" is now used as a generic term in place
of "appeal", "writ of error" and "supersedeas". Similarly, "appeal bond"
has been used in place of bonds for costs, suspending and supersedeas. The
new appeal bond provision takes the place of several provisions of Title 8
and provides a simplified procedure intended to minimize the expense of
appeals and still provide sufficient protection to the party whose judgment
the appealing party seeks to have changed.0 9 The appeal bond statute
changes to thirty days the time in which the appealing party must move
to have a judgment suspended while the appeal is being prosecuted. ' " The
minimum amount necessary for a judgment to be appealable has been
changed from $300 to $500 for most cases.2 1 1 An appeal is now available
from an interlocutory order granting or denying an injunction as well as
from an order dissolving an injunction.'
II. CONCLUSION
The passage of Title 8.01 represents the culmination of an intensive
effort by the legislature to revise and modernize the procedural laws of
Virginia. A desire to update, reorganize and clarify the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Title 19.2) prompted its revision in 1975,12 and similar legisla-
tive policies underlie the current revision of the Virginia Code of Civil
Procedure.2 1 1 Toward those ends, a review of the changes that were made
indicates the primary contribution of the revision was the organization of
previously scattered sections into well-ordered chapters. The substantive
changes were in some cases partially influenced by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 25 but in certain instances the revisers expressly declined
208. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-669 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
209. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676 (Repl. Vol. 1977). See H. Doc. 14, supra note 1, at 373.
210. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676 (Repl. Vol. 1977) gives the appealing party thirty days to
seek the suspension, but a judgment creditor can get execution of a judgment after twenty-
one days and even earlier with approval of the trial court. The appealing party would there-
fore be prudent in seeking a suspension order as soon as practical. H. Doc. 14, supra note 1,
at 373.
211. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-672 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
213. See 10 U. RIcH. L. REv. 133, 149 (1975) for a survey of the changes and modifica-
tions that were made in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
214. These policies are best articulated in the preamble to the engrossed Senate Bill No.
565 (1977): "A bill to revise, rearrange, amend and recodify the general laws of Virginia
relating to civil remedies and procedure .. " (Emphasis added).
215. H. Doc. 14, Appendix I(a), supra note 1, at 24.
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to recommend the adoption of the federal practice. Obsolete practices were
deleted, statutes more logically included in other titles of the Code were
transferred to those titles, and many provisions were modified in order to
grant increased discretion to the courts.
It appears contradictory to state that Title 8.01 represents an extensive
and comprehensive revision to the Virginia Code of Civil Procedure but
that the practitioner will find very few great changes. This, however, is an
accurate statement. The most laudable aspect of the revision is the fact
that in modern Virginia history such a comprehensive revision is unprece-
dented. The organization is excellent, the changes are in concert with
modem practice and the practitioner will most likely find little difficulty
in adapting to those changes.
Scott D. Anderson
Theodore I. Brenner

